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ABSTRACT. To ensure economic viability over time, any efforts to meet the Millennium Development
Goals need to reconcile conservation with development interventions. Particularly, in marginal and risk
prone areas erosion of resilience could make production systems more susceptible to environmental risks
that compromise the economic security. By longitudinal analyses of long-term data records we investigated
the impacts of big push policies on Saami pastoral ecosystems in Arctic Norway. The big push was
accompanied by reindeer herd accumulation and a corresponding degradation of resilience, increasing the
susceptibility to herd losses to predators and adverse winters. For the last 20 years the Norwegian
government has worked to halt degradation of pasture ecosystems and reduce susceptibility to
environmental risks. These intended win-win policies have mainly been based on economic incentives,
which have been developed together with Saami pastoralists through negotiated agreements. We argue that
the continued degradation of the Saami pastoral ecosystems is a “ghost of the development past”, as the
big push policies have resulted in an economic security trap (EST). The gradual reduction of resilience has
persisted as the ex post payments of disaster relief and predator compensation have impeded the long-term
actions to reduce susceptibility to environmental risks, i.e., ex ante policies, thereby increasing dependency
on elevated economic inputs to manage the risks. The transfer of liability for managing risks to the
benefactor, both through ex ante and ex post policies, has further discouraged and constrained opportunities
for adaptation by the pastoralists.
Key Words: big push; development policies; economic security trap; environmental risks; pastoralist
ecosystems; resilience; Saami; tundra; win-win 
INTRODUCTION
Human interventions that change ecosystems to
improve human welfare could lead to unintended
feedbacks and consequences for other ecosystem
services, including those important for local
livelihoods (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
2005, Chan et al. 2007). Crucial is the maintenance
of resilience, which ensures the ability of producers
to cope with recurrent disturbances and provide
production opportunities over time (Bennett and
Balvanera 2007). Central to resilience thinking is
the nonlinear behavior of social-ecological systems
(SES) as coupled ecological and social systems
(Folke 2006). SES emphasize that ecosystems
cannot be understood separately from the human
activities and decisions that shape the ecosystem,
and social systems are dependent on the long-term
capacity of ecosystems to sustain human activities.
Key elements of resilience thinking are the ability
of SES to tolerate shocks and regenerate after
disturbance, and the potential for human activities
to cause abrupt shifts to new and fundamentally
different regimes. Gradual loss of resilience may
push the system closer to a threshold, reducing the
likelihood of SES to cope with and recover from
shocks and stresses. Such SES could be susceptible
even to small-scale disturbances, resulting in
sudden and potentially irreversible shifts to
alternative regimes, which may be desirable or
undesirable for producers, communities, or decision
makers.
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One example of such undesirable regimes are
poverty traps, which can be thought of as a minimum
threshold for assets or income, below which people
are unable to build productive assets, educate their
children, improve their health and nutrition, and
increase income over time (Carter and Barrett
2006). Producers are in such cases unable to buffer
shocks or overcome persistent low income
situations and consequently remain in poverty.
States of persistent poverty are particularly
prevalent in marginal environments with few
exploitable natural resources of low and variable
productivity (UNDP 2007). Deprivation is caused
by the direct effects of environmental risks that
cause substantial losses in income, productive
assets, and consumption, but also indirectly by the
self-reinforcing mechanisms associated with long-
term adaptations to environmental risks, i.e., ex
ante, or the short-term actions or coping
mechanisms to adverse environmental events, i.e.,
ex post (Osbahr et al. 2008). In such cases external
efforts might be necessary to stimulate self-
sufficiency and protect against recurrent environmental
risks.
The “big push” approach has been promoted as an
effective development intervention to escape
poverty traps. It assumes that a temporary boost in
public investments is necessary to lift regimes of
persistent poverty above the minimum subsistence
levels and to higher levels of human development
(Sachs 2005, Sanchez et al. 2007). Disaster relief or
insurances are further needed to avoid environmental
risks pushing households below the subsistence
threshold for self-sustainability (UNDP 2007). To
overcome development barriers, large-scale
investments should be undertaken according to
comprehensive plans involving agricultural
productivity, health, education, and infrastructure.
After the big push the producers are assumed to have
the sufficient skills, capital, and means to move
toward self-sufficiency. The big push approach has
been criticized for not paying sufficient attention to
failures of previous efforts of large-scale
development (Easterly 2006). Large-scale, centrally
controlled investments may be less effective to
accomplish development and conservation goals
than flexible, small-scale interventions that allow
for learning and adaptations over time (Nelson
2009). Furthermore, to avoid big pushes shifting the
SES to another undesirable state, attention must be
paid to the ecosystems potential to support these
changes as well as to the risks of creating cycles of
dependencies and disincentives for self-sufficiency
(Kofinas and Chapin 2009, Chapin et al. 2010).
In Saami pastoral ecosystems in Northern Norway,
big push policies were implemented to lift
communities to a higher level of human
development. From 1976 there was a sudden
increase in public investments directed toward
modernization of the production system. The
reforms included (i) payments to herders and local
districts to increase net income, (ii) investments in
housing, technology, infrastructure, research, and
education, (iii) herd management to increase
production per unit area, i.e., intensification, and
(iv) disaster funds to compensate extraordinary
losses (Riseth and Vatn 2009). When introducing
such big push policies, it is crucial to craft policies
that fit the ecological dynamics of the environment.
Climatic variability and resource fluctuations could
conceal gradual changes, such as loss of resilience,
that are caused by increased human activities
(Ludwig et al. 1993, Cinner et al. 2009). Big push
policies therefore need to stimulate adaptation to
environmental risks over time, i.e., ex ante policies.
However, and as we elucidate in this article, short-
term actions in response to adverse environmental
events, i.e., ex post policies, also need to be
compatible with the long-term conservation and
development goals. Otherwise, such policies may
result in what we term economic security traps
(EST), a policy-driven situation in which erosion of
ecosystem resilience may increase the susceptibility
to environmental risks, which in turn may require
elevated inputs to ensure economic security.
The aim of this article is twofold. First, we analyzed
changes in the Saami pastoral ecosystems by
longitudinal analysis of economic security policies
as drivers of change in the SES. Second, we
elucidated the outcome of past and present policies
for the resilience of the current regime. We focused
on reindeer numbers and their condition as a
surrogate for resilience and losses to predators and
climatic risks. By using reindeer as surrogates we
can build on long-term data records (~ 60 years) to
analyze the relationships between policies, public
investments, resource fluctuations, and condition.
The relationship to ecosystem degradation has been
published elsewhere, but is briefly summarized in
Appendix 1 to clarify the relationship between
reindeer numbers, condition, pastures, and losses
associated with environmental risks. In addition,
there are several studies demonstrating broader
ecosystem consequences that appear to compromise
goals for conservation and maintenance of
ecosystem services (e.g., Suominen and Olofsson
2000, Bråthen et al. 2007, Ims et al. 2007,
Tømmervik et al. 2009). These broader ecosystem
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consequences may be of importance in the long
term, but in this study we narrow our scope to
livelihood resilience in Saami pastoral communities,
which are reliant on reindeer both economically and
culturally (Riseth 2006). Thus, in our case,
livelihood resilience to environmental risks is
coupled to the likelihood for losses of reindeer to
adverse events, as well as the ability of households
and communities to cope with and recover from
such events. To analyze both the economic security
policy as a driver of change and livelihood
resilience, it is necessary to combine multiple
methods and data sources including archival data,




The Saami pastoral ecosystem covers 40% of the
Norwegian mainland (~ 140,000 km²; Reindeer
Husbandry Administration 2008). The present
study focuses on the Kautokeino region, which
encompasses 45% of the Saami pastoralists in
Norway. Most of the pastoralists move between
inland winter pasture and summer pastures near the
coast. Winter areas are characterized by a stable and
dry climate, yet the reindeer herds are highly
vulnerable to adverse snow conditions in late winter
(Tveraa et al. 2007). The winter pastures have not
been formally divided in land tenures, but family
groups (siida) have traditionally moved to defined
pasture areas, with some flexibility to move beyond
boundaries under adverse climatic conditions
(Paine 1994).
The summer pastures are divided into local districts
with boards representing the pastoralist families that
graze in that area (Ulvevadet 2008). Within these
local districts there are operation units, which are
licensed entitlements to practice reindeer
husbandry. The payments to Saami pastoralists are
channeled through the local districts and the
operation units. The comanagement system,
organized in national, regional, and local boards,
regulates operation units, reindeer numbers, and
access to different pastures (Ulvevadet 2008, Riseth
and Vatn 2009). The public investments in Saami
pastoral communities are, however, regulated by the
General Agreement for the Reindeer Industry. The
agreement is a result of negotiation between the
government and the Saami Reindeer Herders’
Association (Ulvevadet 2008, Riseth and Vatn
2009). The comanagement boards and the
negotiations have been a part of the governance
system since the 1978 Reindeer Management Act,
which means that Saami pastoralists have
participated in policy making. The exceptions are
extraordinary disaster funds established by the
Norwegian Parliament to compensate for abnormal
winter losses, or predator compensations that are
handled by the environmental authorities.
Claims for compensations of losses owing to
predation by nationally protected large carnivores,
such as wolf (Canis lupus), wolverine (Gulo gulo),
brown bear (Ursus arctos), lynx (Lynx lynx), and
golden eagle (Aquila chrysaetos), are managed by
the environmental authorities together with the
Reindeer Husbandry Administration (RHA).
Compensations are provided on the basis of
documented losses combined with official
assessments of the likelihood for losses. In the past,
carnivores were removed to ensure protection of
livestock, but were protected by law in 1970.
However, regulations do not allow wolves to
establish packs within reindeer herding areas,
wolverines are not allowed to reproduce within
reindeer calving areas, and lynx and wolverines are
still culled to protect the reindeer herds.
Policy analyses
All the provisions were analyzed with regard to
objectives and requirements. The payments were
divided into four categories on the basis of their
main purpose (see Appendix 2). The main purpose
of operating subsidies is to improve living standards
by covering the costs of managing operation units
or local districts. The subsidies could include
production requirements, but the main intention is
to ensure a higher net income for pastoralists.
Production subsidies aim to stimulate increased
production and deliveries to slaughterhouses, as
well as to spare winter pastures. Preventive
measures are targeted toward reduction of losses to
predators or adverse climate, and finally,
compensations cover abnormal losses on winter
pastures and losses to predators. The payments
within these categories were analyzed using linear
models to estimate the effect of total disbursement
on harvest rates and relationship to slaughter
income. Policy analysis of official reports and
propositions was conducted to identify: (i)
development policies, as well as the rationale behind
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the policy instruments chosen, and (ii) the ex ante
and ex post policies directed toward predator and
climatic risks. These analyses were used to interpret
the shifts in public investments over time.
Public investments
Electronic databases on payments were available
from 1991 to present. Records on payment from
1980-1991 were collected from the paper archives
of the RHA. From 1950 to 1979 investments were
reported by the Saami bailiff, the attendant for the
Norwegian government before the establishment of
the RHA. In this period a few of the subsidies were
managed by slaughterhouses and had to be
calculated based on provisions and deliveries to
slaughterhouses (see Appendix 2). The Directorate
for Nature Management has electronic databases on
predator compensation, but for the period prior to
1981 we collected data from the paper archives. All
payments were adjusted according to the 2008
consumer price index published on Statistics
Norway's web page (www.ssb.no/english) and co-
nverted to USD. We did not include indirect
payments, such as public investments in houses,
fences, transport, education, and slaughterhouses,
as well as access to cheap credit and tax and duty
exemptions. Subsidies other than for reindeer meat
or by-products have not been substantial and are
therefore not included in the analyses.
The number of families and owners was available
in the Saami bailiff reports until 1978, and was later
reported as licensed herding units by the Economic
Committee for Reindeer Husbandry. It is important
to keep in mind that a strong initial increase of
herding units relative to number of families could
be dependent on the licensing practices of the area
boards, which we therefore checked in this study.
Harvest rates and carcass mass
The income of Saami pastoralists is dependent on
reindeer abundance, which fluctuates according to
productivity on summer pastures, winter herd
losses, and harvest rates (Tveraa et al. 2007, Riseth
and Vatn 2009). Reindeer abundance was provided
by the RHA, which has electronic databases on
reindeer numbers in spring before calving from
1945-2008. Harvest rates and income from reindeer
meat were reported by the Saami Bailiff until 1979
and thereafter by the Economic Committee for
Reindeer Husbandry. Reliable data on harvest rates
are not available before 1970.
The most immediate ecological outcome of herd
accumulation was examined by longitudinal
analyses of reindeer carcass mass. Carcass mass is
a critical parameter for survival and reproduction of
large ungulates, and calves in particular have been
proposed as an efficient indicator for managing
large ungulate populations (Morellet et al. 2007).
Carcass mass is not only an indicator of the
availability of pasture resources, but is also an
indicator of ecological resilience, because reduced
weight increases susceptibility to losses in adverse
winters as well as to predators (see Appendix 1).
The higher likelihood of losses due to lower weights
indicates that the Saami pastoral ecosystems have a
lower ability to cope with disturbances, which
implies reduced livelihood resilience for the
herders.
Since 1981, calf weights were publicly available
from the RHA, but before 1981 data on calf weights
are limited, mainly because of the cultural practice
of not slaughtering calves during this time period.
There are, however, studies that report weights of
1.5-year-old males from 1961-1963 (Movinkel and
Prestbakmo 1968), and we also found records from
1973-75, 1977, 1981, and 1982 in the paper archives
at the RHA. Since 1996, weight data on both calves
and 1.5-year-old males are available. The carcass
mass of 1.5-year-old males should reflect the quality
of the pastures when the animals were calves (their
first summer) and the following winter and summer.
Accordingly, there was a strong positive
relationship between the weight of 1.5-year-old
males and the weight of calves the same year
combined with the weight of calves the year before:
m = 3.81 + 0.40c0 + 0.82c1, R² = 0.97, n=11, where
m is the weight of 1.5-year-old males, c0 is the
weight of calves the same year, and c1 is the weight
of calves the year before (when the 1.5-year-old
males were themselves calves). We used this
relationship to predict the weights of 1.5-year-old
males from the weights of calves in the period when
data on 1.5-year-old males were missing (from
1982-1995). Because the carcass weight of 1.5-
year-old is a proxy for pasture quality the year the
males were slaughtered as well as the year the males
were calves, we included a one year time lag in the
analyses of the relationship between animal density
and carcass mass.
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Interview inquiry
The interviews were designed to understand spatial
and temporal differences in the Saami pastoral
communities that underlie reindeer abundance and
productivity (Appendix 3). Environmental risks
were one of several thematic areas covered in the
interviews. Others were governance, symbolic and
social capital, herding practices, and economic
organization. The study included 77 Saami
pastoralists from 20 of the 34 local districts that have
winter pastures on common grazing lands. The
interview inquiry was limited to the period after the
big push. We used published literature in
combination with the interviews to reflect on the
current practices of Saami pastoralists to prepare
for, cope with, and recover from adverse winters.
RESULTS
The big push policies
After World War II, more than 50% of the Saami
pastoral families in Finnmark County owned fewer
than 200 reindeer, which was regarded as a
subsistence minimum with few possibilities for herd
or capital accumulation (Saami Bailiff Reports
1950-1979). During the 1960s and 1970s,
development policies were gradually implemented
to improve the pastoral family economy. The
policies aimed to bring welfare to Norwegian
standards, as well as to even out differences in herd
sizes among Saami pastoral families (Paine 1994).
The public investments were largely influenced by
the recommendations of the Saami committee,
which was appointed by the government to suggest
measures for improving the economic and cultural
status of the Saami communities (Norwegian
Ministry of Church Affairs and Education 1959,
Kalstad 1999). Among the concerns was the future
recruitment to reindeer husbandry because of the
hard working conditions and low living standards.
The committee therefore suggested investments in
housing, slaughterhouses, roads, restocking, fences,
vocational training in reindeer pastoralism,
education, research, and administration. While
raising living standards, the public investments also
resulted in rapid cultural changes of the Saami
pastoral communities (Paine 1994, Kalstad 1999).
The houses were built in a few settlements, and
increased the distances between the family and the
seasonal pastures. As a result the male pastoralists
started to commute between pastures and the
settlement by use of motorized vehicles. Some
pastoralists also privatized shared pastures by
setting up fences, thus reducing the need for
continuous herding. The costs of housing,
maintenance of fences, and motorized vehicles
subsequently increased the need for monetary
income, which could be achieved through the
spouses’ wage income, governmental subsidies,
and/or by increasing production of meat for the
market. Meat production for the market was further
encouraged by the big push policies of the 1970s,
which aimed at rationalizing reindeer herd
management by increasing efficiency and herd
productivity (Paine 1994).
At the beginning of the 1970s, higher expectations
of oil revenues encouraged higher investments in
rural development programs in northern Norway,
partly to counteract increasing demands and income
in urban areas (Ministry of Agriculture 1974).
Consequently the big push toward modernization
commenced (Ministry of Agriculture 1976),
including operating grants to reindeer herders to
reduce costs, thereby improving the living standard
(Fig. 1c,d, Appendix 2). Besides operating grants,
the investments included guaranteed minimum
prices and price subsidies, as well as indirect
subsidies to slaughterhouses and transport. These
reforms aimed at modernizing and increasing
production, at the same time as ensuring sustainable
resource use. The economic policies were based on
negotiated agreements between the Norwegian
government and the Saami Reindeer Herders’
Association, and were modeled according to the
agricultural policies already in place for farmers
(Paine 1994, Kalstad 1999). Traditionally it was
common for family members to exit pastoralism in
favor of other livelihoods or adopt a peasant strategy
that combined reindeer herding with fisheries or
small-scale agriculture (Paine 1994, Olsson and
Lewis 1995, Riseth 2006). The big push policies
created disincentives for such livelihood adaptations
because subsidies were directed toward meat
production and disregarded other sources of income
associated with the Saami pastoral communities.
Specialization was further encouraged by the 1978
Reindeer Management Act that defined Saami
pastoralism as an occupation, and established
licensed herding units (driftsenhet) through which
the payments were channeled. The subsidy
programs required that one person in the family was
fully engaged in reindeer husbandry. The combined
effects of sedentarization, motorized vehicles, and
economic rationalization also changed the
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traditional family-based herding practices, which
were founded on stronger engagement by all family
members in daily activities related to herding and
utilization of other reindeer-related products, such
as skin and antlers (Paine 1994, Kalstad 1999).
The big push increased recruitment to reindeer
pastoralism (Fig. 2). Most applicants, usually men,
who fulfilled the requirements in 1979 of income
statement and sufficient reindeer numbers (> 100)
were automatically licensed (Area Board, West
Finnmark, unpublished Minutes of Meetings, 
1982-87). Only 3% of the applicants were rejected
before 1987, whereas most were rejected thereafter.
Many households were granted more than one
license before 1987, which apparently had increased
subsidies per family (Berg 2000). The official
politics was to ensure the rights of pastoralists to
continue their traditional way of life, and the
government was therefore reluctant to control entry
into the occupation (Paine 2006). The Department
of Agriculture did, however, provide financial
assistance to pastoralists who would exit the
occupation, but few accepted the offer.
Furthermore, the additional sources of income
combined with favorable and stable winter climates
allowed for low harvest rates resulting in an increase
in reindeer numbers from 40,000 in 1969 to a peak
of 112,000 in 1989 (Fig. 1b; Paine 1994, Riseth and
Vatn 2009). After 1987 the number of licenses has
declined, but the number of family members who
own reindeer in each unit continued to increase.
Win-win policies
Concerns about the rapid increase of reindeer herds,
reduced weights, and degradation of lichen winter
pastures resulted in a second major policy shift in
1989. The government and the Saami Reindeer
Herders’ Association agreed that ecological
sustainability is a prerequisite for economic
development, and introduced production subsidies
that rewarded higher harvest rates. Harvest
requirements had been a part of the operating
subsidies, but were secondary to the major aim of
covering the costs of an increasingly modernized
reindeer pastoralism. These new subsidies aimed
for win-win outcomes by enhancing efficiency of
meat production per hectare. The policies were
directed toward increasing the proportion of
productive females in the herds, as well as reducing
risks of losing animals on winter pastures
(Appendix 2). Such win-win policies were also
emphasized by a White paper (Ministry of
Agriculture 1992a) and the subsequent Parliament
resolution (Ministry of Agriculture 1992b). The
long-term goal was to balance ecological,
economic, and cultural sustainability by adjusting
number of reindeer and Saami pastoralists to the
pasture capacity. To reach these goals the economic
incentives were designed to increase total harvest
rate, proportion of calves harvested, and to
encourage slaughter of reindeer before entering the
winter pastures (Appendix 2). It was assumed that
higher production per animal would allow for higher
income per household and protect pastures, thereby
allowing more pastoralists to stay in business. The
national and regional comanagement boards were
given the responsibility to set the maximum number
of reindeer and to regulate the number of herding
unit licenses, but the production subsidies coupled
with harvest requirements continued as the major
policy instrument to reach the goals.
Policies toward environmental risks
Before the onset of big push there were adverse
weather events in 1958, 1962, and 1968, when too
much snow in late winter caused substantial
reductions in reindeer populations (Saami bailiff
reports, 1950-1979). A disaster fund that included
both ex ante preventive measures and ex post
compensations for abnormal losses was established
in 1976. The disaster fund had strict requirements,
and combined with stable and favorable winters, it
was hardly used in the big push period (Fig. 1c,
Appendix 2). The compensation payments in this
era were mainly issued for losses to predators.
However, subsequent to catastrophic winters with
heavy snowfalls in 1997 and 2000, compensations
for winter losses were high, and, together with a
considerable increase in predator compensations,
the total disbursement yielded far more than has ever
been given in subsidies.
Since 1989, production subsidies that aimed to
change herding practices to higher harvest rates, calf
slaughter, and autumn slaughter have been the
dominating ex ante policies (Appendix 2). In the
first three years, extra production subsidies were
provided to rapidly increase harvest rates (Fig. 1c).
In recent years there has been a small increase in ex
ante preventive measures only aimed at reducing
susceptibility to losses, such as crisis fodder,
alternative migration routes and pastures, shepherd
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Fig. 1. Time course featuring the relationship between economic security policies, harvest rates, reindeer
abundances, and carcass mass. Dashed vertical lines indicate major policy shifts. The postwar period
was characterized by economic deprivation. Welfare policies started in the 1960s, but the big push was
initiated with the first General Agreement for the Reindeer Industry in 1976. Sustainability measures
were introduced in 1989, and the subsequent period has been characterized by ex ante and ex post
policies toward environmental risks. (a) Reindeer abundance (herd size in spring before calving) and
carcass mass. (b) Reindeer abundance and percent annual harvest (animals slaughtered in percent of
herd size before calving). (c,d) Operating costs (blue) dominate in the big push period. Production
subsidies and preventive measures (red) work mainly ex ante, whereas compensations work ex post
(green). (c) Total disbursement in USD (adjusted according to the 2008 CPI). (d) Time period for
disbursement of the different subsidies and compensations (see Appendix 1 for detailed descriptions of
time period, requirements, and quality of the data).
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Fig. 2. Time course of the number of Saami families/herding units (hatched, blue) and number of
pastoralists (solid, red).
dogs, fences, or extra personnel for herding.
Compared with the production subsidies, however,
payments for preventive measures have been
negligible.
In short, payments from the government have served
three main purposes: (i) operating subsidies to
increase living standards, (ii) production subsidies
to increase harvest and thereby reduce losses, i.e.,
ex ante policy, and (iii) compensation for losses to
reduce the effects of adverse weather and predators,
i.e., ex post policy. The shifts in the use of the
different instruments reflect the major changes in
policy from the big push to the win-win (Fig. 1c,d).
Harvest rates and carcass mass
The period since 1989 has been characterized by
irregular harvest and a variable production (Fig. 1a,
b). Three periods of high harvest rate (> 35%)
occurred after the big push (1989, 1995, and 2004;
Fig. 1b). These periods were associated with
generally high reindeer numbers and high
production subsidies. Two periods of exceptionally
low harvest rate (< 20%) occurred after the two
catastrophic winters with high snow accumulation
on winter and spring pastures (1997 and 2000). The
adverse winters caused substantial losses for the
reindeer herders, but the economic losses were
largely compensated ex post directly by the
authorities (Fig. 1c). After the winter of 2000,
reindeer numbers increased again from 62,000 and
peaked at 96,000 in 2003. Accordingly, the
dynamics of ex ante and ex post policies were
closely linked to the fluctuations in harvest rates and
reindeer numbers, because the public expenditures
on subsidies and compensations alternately
stabilized the income for reindeer herders. The total
governmental disbursement (D) was accordingly
inversely related to slaughter income (S) since 1989
(linear model: D = 40.2 – 0.58 x S, R² = 0.49, n =
19, P = 0.001). The relationship was weaker in the
big push period (linear model: D = 27.7 – 0.28 x S,
R² = 0.06, n = 13, P = 0.43).
The decline in carcass mass of 1.5-year-old reindeer
is evident in the historical records, ranging from
more than 30 kg before the big push to less than 24
kg after 1989 (Fig. 1a). Accordingly, carcass mass
was inversely related to reindeer numbers (linear
regression with carcass mass [BM; response
variable] lagged with one year after reindeer number
[N; predictor variable]: BM = 33.8 – 1.04x10- 4 x N,
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R² = 0.72, n = 34, P < 0.001). In the period after the
big push the fluctuation in reindeer numbers has
temporarily increased carcass mass, but this has
been followed by a new period of increase in
reindeer number and subsequent decrease in carcass
mass.
Resilience of the Saami pastoral ecosystem
The most obvious consequence of herd
accumulation has been the degradation of lichen
pastures in wintering areas in the period 1961-2000,
whereas a moderate increase was detected around
the millennium shift because of lowered populations
in the 1990s (Tømmervik et al. 2009). Tømmervik
et al. (2009) also suggested that the removal of the
barrier effect of the thick lichen cover has promoted
growth of the mountain birch (Betula pubescens)
forest on winter pastures. Recent studies have also
documented effects of herd density on ecosystem
productivity on summer pastures (Bråthen et al.
2007), as well as on other herbivores (Ims et al.
2007). High reindeer density increases the
susceptibility to environmental risks, because
reduced body condition increases the likelihood for
losses to adverse winters as well as to predators (see
Appendix 1). Loss of pastures to development in the
big push period was probably important near
regional centers. However, 78% of the total land
area and 84% of the winter pasture area in Finnmark
is still largely undisturbed (> 1 km from
encroachment; Norwegian Directorate for Nature
Management, INON, version 01.08., www.dirnat.no/
inon). Although encroachment might have played a
part, the increase in reindeer numbers during the big
push period was a major driver resulting in loss of
resilience through pasture degradation and
increased susceptibility to adverse winter
conditions. The efficiency of carcass mass as an
indicator of pastoral ecosystem conditions has also
been supported by a governmental task force of
scientists, reindeer herders, and managers, as well
as by 70% of the reindeer herders that we
interviewed.
The pastoralists in our interviews expressed concern
for adverse winters such as those of 1997 and 2000,
when heavy snowfall hindered access to pastures
thereby resulting in mass starvation (see Appendix
1). These situations were described as social
tragedies, as pastoralists desperately attempted to
gather the herds, provide crisis fodder, and move to
alternative pasture areas. To adapt to adverse
winters, more than 90% of interviewees maintained
that slaughtering of calves and weak animals would
improve herd condition and reduce susceptibility to
losses. In other words, they did not regard herd
accumulation as the major strategy for self-
protection against environmental risks, but to
pursue ex ante strategies, they depend on
collaboration with the surrounding pastoralists. As
argued by the majority of reindeer herders in our
interviews, the big push resulted in a gradual
breakdown of informal grazing tenures in the winter
grazing areas and more competition for pasture
resources. Of those interviewed, 83% reported
tensions with neighbors because of overlapping use
of grazing resources. Scarcity or tensions on winter
pastures was defined as the bottleneck for reindeer
herding by most of the pastoralists. The increased
overlap has also reduced the flexibility to move to
alternative pastures. Artificial feeding has not
become a usual practice, with only 12% feeding on
a permanent basis. However, 39% maintained that
small amounts of fodder were given in limited time
periods to ensure that the reindeer would tolerate
crisis fodder in adverse winters.
Modern reindeer husbandry has increased the costs
associated with reindeer herding, which put higher
demands on income levels (Riseth 2006). While
conducting our interviews in 2007, as much as 46%
of the income in the Kautokeino regions was from
governmental inputs such as subsidies (29%),
compensations for losses (11%), and pasture loss
(6%; Karlstad and Lie 2009). Subsidies have been
targeted toward increased specialization on meat
production. These policies have influenced the
economic adaptations of the households. In our
interviews, 73% maintained that meat production
was a primary motivation for their husbandry
practices, whereas only 12% perceived production
for a market as unimportant, a result that contrasted
with earlier description of livelihood adaptation
among Saami pastoralists (Paine 1994). Furthermore,
there were only 12% who reported any substantial
supplementary income from reindeer related
products. In general, supplementary income from
Saami handicraft, berries, hunting, and fishing was
rather low, only 2.3% in 2007 (Karlstad and Lie
2009). Although it appears that Saami pastoralists
are highly dependent on governmental input and
meat production, the costs are also covered by wage
income. Among those interviewed 60% reported
wages from spouses as an important part of the
household income. Today, mostly men are working
daily with the herds, while both the wife and the
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children are participating in work intensive periods.
Only 3 males of those we interviewed combined
wages with reindeer herding. The changes have
made reindeer herders highly specialized, but the
spouse’s wage income and subsidies increase
abilities of the majority of pastoralists to cope with
disturbances. The ex post payments also allow for
fast recovery rate subsequent to adverse winters
(Fig. 1).
DISCUSSION
The big push for welfare in the Saami pastoral
community aimed to lift the SES above the
minimum subsistence level to higher levels of
human development. The policies were rooted in
social democratic ideals characteristic of the Nordic
welfare state, emphasizing equitable status of
citizens and equal distribution of wealth and income
(Paine 1994, Olsson and Lewis 1995). The big push
policies had unintended consequences of herd
accumulation, and the decline in resilience has made
the Saami pastoral communities more susceptible
to losses to predator and adverse winters (Fig. 1,
Appendix 1). To maintain the living standards and
the modernized herding practices achieved after the
big push, certain levels of external economic input
were necessary. Similar policies focusing on
rationalization of herd management have also been
implemented in the other Nordic countries, Finland
and Sweden, and have made pastoralists more
dependent on meat production for the market to
cover costs (Forbes et al. 2006). The win-win
policies introduced in 1989 aimed to reconcile
economic and ecological sustainability. Concurrently,
the payments to Saami pastoralists were linked to
harvest rates, and to calf and autumn slaughter
through production subsidies, which have been the
major form of ex ante policies directed toward
environmental risks. These policies have resulted in
variable and low production, in which Saami
pastoralists have found it timely to harvest in some
years, yet the practice of herd accumulation has
continued the following years, thus keeping
ecosystem resilience persistently low. The
increased susceptibility does not come at expense
of economic security as ex post disaster relief and
predator compensations buffer economic losses.
On the basis of these results we argue that the big
push policies have resulted in an economic security
trap (EST). EST occurs when policies that protect
against economic deprivation enhance the
susceptibility to environmental risks. The loss of
resilience necessitates further protection against
risks, thus gradually shifting the liability for ex ante
and ex post approaches to the benefactor. Such
economic security policies create vicious circles
that may temporarily secure the economic income
of beneficiaries, but in the long term, environmental
disasters may hit harder when adversities occur. In
other words, the maladaptive policies may trap
people in a system that becomes increasingly more
susceptible to environmental fluctuations thereby
compromising the economic viability over time.
Similar mechanisms have been suggested by
Bennett and Balvanera (2007) as intensification of
agricultural production that increases vulnerability
to climate change and pests can lead to dependency
on elevated economic inputs to manage risks.
Production systems with a high degree of
environmental fluctuations increase the likelihood
of such feedback mechanisms, because gradual
erosion of ecosystem resilience is hard to separate
from increased environmental variation (Ludwig et
al. 1993, Cinner et al. 2009). An analogue to our
case is overexploitation of fluctuating fish
populations described by Ludwig et al. (1993).
Unrestricted investments in fishing fleet capacity in
relatively stable years are often economically
compensated for in adverse years, resulting in a net
overcapacity and overharvest of the resource over
time. Likewise, the big push of Saami pastoral
communities has built up a production system with
too many animals in climatically favorable years,
for which increased losses in adverse years have
been compensated by ex post payments, resulting
in persistently low resilience.
After a big push, producers are expected to move
toward self-sufficiency, because modernized
production processes allow higher productivity and
product diversity (Sanchez et al. 2007). In the case
of decreased resilience, the independence of public
transfers may fail to materialize because of the need
to buffer economic losses under adverse conditions
(Beier et al. 2009). Without exit strategies big push
policies may create cycles of dependencies and
disincentives for self-sufficiency (Kofinas and
Chapin 2009, Chapin et al. 2010). In our case the
disaster relief and predator compensation provide
extra economic input that reduces the economic
risks of herd accumulation. Subsidized risk
management tends to work against other policy
measures, as economically secure producers could
afford greater risks to obtain greater productivity
and higher returns (Goodwin and Vado 2007,
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UNDP 2007). The ex post payments may therefore
counteract work toward self-protection that could
potentially lower the risks among all producers.
When policies do not work it may be attributed to
incongruence in values, knowledge, or perceived
risks (Adger et al. 2009). In pastoral production
systems, herd accumulation is often perceived as an
insurance against environmental risks, which was
also traditionally the case for the Saami pastoralists
(Paine 1994, Riseth and Vatn 2009). The interviews
of the herders are not consistent with this view
because as many as 90% maintain it would be better
to prepare for adverse winters by taking out calves
and weak animals to reduce susceptibility to losses.
Such a strategy is, however, dependent on neighbors
doing the same, because the likelihood of loosing
reindeers depends on the surrounding herd density
on the shared pastures (Næss and Bårdsen 2010). If
the other pastoralists do not reduce their herds,
individual owners will still benefit from owning
larger herds. The herders emphasize that herd
accumulation strengthens their position on common
pastures in climatically favorable years. As is
known from other pastoral production systems, the
present competition for common pastures could be
a result of the breakdown of informal tenure systems
induced by external pressures (Borgerhoff Mulder
and Coppolillo 2005), which in our case were the
big push policies. In this period the payments were
used for herd expansionism (Riseth and Vatn 2009).
The positioning on winter pasture may thus
constrain opportunities for ex ante strategies to
environmental risks. The investments have also
increased the recruitment (Fig. 2) and overlap in
seasonal pastures, which limit coping responses in
adverse winters. Reduced mobility and opportunities
for flexible use of reserve pastures is well known to
erode resilience by reducing the ability to prepare
for and cope with adverse events in pastoral systems
(Forbes et al. 2009, Robinson and Berkes 2010).
Besides herd management, economic diversification
is widely recognized as a risk aversive strategy in
resource-dependent communities, because the
production gains of specialization are traded against
the greater security afforded by spreading risks
(Ellis 2000). In the big push period, reindeer
pastoralism was defined as an occupation and
demanded full engagement in reindeer herding, de-
emphasizing supplementary sources of income. On
the one hand, the strong degree of specialization in
reindeer meat production has reduced resilience of
households to environmental risks. Besides
increasing the likelihood for losses, the pastoral
specialization has reduced the opportunities to adapt
by extensification, migration, or flexible use of
pastures because of the lack of vacant pastures
(Riseth and Vatn 2009). On the other hand, for the
majority of the Saami pastoral households, the
public sector provides opportunities for diversification
through education and wage labor (Reindeer
Husbandry Administration 2009), which together
with the ex post payments allow for faster recovery
after disturbances and increase the potential for
adaptation to changes.
Public investments in Tongrass National Forest in
Alaska have resulted in a similar situation because
economic variability has subsequently been
buffered by the government (Beier et al. 2009). The
trap was explained by rigidity in governance,
whereby the command-and-control approach by the
forestry sector impeded adaptations to societal
demands. In our case the public investments were
negotiated with reindeer herders, and the
comanagement system has had a major
responsibility for regulating access to pastures,
recruitment, and reindeer numbers (Paine 2006,
Ulvevadet 2008). Although governance of the
Saami pastoral ecosystems may not qualify as a
command-and-control approach, large-scale investments
have been directed toward one resource, which has




In marginal and risk prone areas, big push policies
could gradually erode resilience, thereby increasing
dependency on elevated economic inputs to manage
the risks. The transfer of liability for managing risks
to the benefactor, both through ex ante and ex post
policies, may further discourage self protection by
the producers. To avoid EST, such plans need to
include ex ante policies that encourage self-
protection against environmental risks, whereas
short term actions after environmental disasters, i.
e., ex post payments, also need to comply with long-
term goals. In our case the ex post payments of
disaster relief and predator compensation have
partly impeded the long-term actions to reduce
susceptibility to environmental risks, that is, ex ante
policies. However, ex ante policies that increase
external economic input could also have contributed
to the maintenance of EST. The result has been
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persistently low resilience in terms of higher
likelihood for losses and reduced flexibility to move
to vacant pastures for pastoralists. On the other
hand, ex post payment and the spouse’s wage
income buffers the economic consequences of
adverse events.
In recent years there have been policy changes
attempting to deal with the increasing numbers of
reindeers. Instead of using economic incentives as
a major instrument to reach ecological
sustainability, there has been more emphasis on
regulatory approaches (Ulvevadet and Hausner
2011). The 2007 Reindeer Management Act
devolves more responsibilities to the siida to make
their own rules for reaching sustainable goals,
whereas sanction possibilities by the comanagement
boards and the government have been strengthened
(Ulvevadet 2008). Voluntary programs to divide
shared winter pastures into siida tenures have also
been attempted. The latest suggestion by the
government, dated 4 May 2011, is to remove
regional comanagement boards, which will reduce
the multilevel comanagement system to a national
and a local level. New laws and regulations are one
trajectory for dealing with EST, but there are
alternative paths that may not have been sufficiently
explored. The multilevel comanagement system
could profit by integrating the principles of adaptive
management that allow for systematic monitoring
and learning from human interventions in
ecosystems (Lee 1993, Olofsson 2011). In marginal
and risk prone areas the high uncertainties of human
impacts on ecosystems make monitoring, learning
about, and adaptation to ecosystem changes even
more important. Adaptive comanagement seeks to
bridge the principles of adaptive management and
comanagement (Armitage et al. 2007), and could
create arenas for mutual learning and trust building
that may represent an alternative trajectory for
escaping the EST.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol16/iss3/art4/responses/
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Appendix 1. Density-dependent effects and resilience to climatically related disturbances in 
reindeer husbandry.  
In a large-scale study including data from 55 reindeer herding districts in Norway from 1980-
2005, Tveraa et al. (2007) found close relationships between harvest rates, slaughter weights, 
winter climate, and population dynamics. They concluded that in areas with benign a winter 
climate, intensive harvesting is necessary to avoid negative density-dependent effects. Compared 
with other areas in Norway, the reindeer herding area in the present study, Kautokeino, is 
characterized by a benign and favorable winter climate and low and variable harvest (Tveraa et 
al. 2007). The combined effects of low harvest and effective control of large predators were: (i) 
high reindeer stocking density, (ii) low slaughter weights, and (iii) high susceptibility to year-to-
year variation in winter climate (Tveraa et al. 2007). Because of these circumstances, the 
reindeer husbandry in Kautokeino has low resilience/ability to withstand unfavorable weather 
conditions. This assertion is supported by a number of detailed, individual-based studies of 
losses in several herds in the area (Tveraa et al. 2003, Fauchald et al. 2004a,b, Bårdsen et al. 
2008, 2010). For example, Tveraa et al. (2003) found large losses of calves and even adult 
females in one year (2000) with deep snow in the spring. The losses were mainly due to 
starvation and still births; however some calves were also taken by predators. There was a close 
relationship between the body mass of the mother and the fate of the calves, suggesting that the 
losses to predators were a compensatory effect of starvation. This conclusion was further 
supported by the fact that the losses of calves to predators in years with favorable spring 
conditions were negligible (Tveraa et al. 2003, Fauchald et al. 2004a,b). Moreover, comparisons 
of the reindeer herding districts within the Kautokeino and Karasjok reindeer herding areas, 
show strong negative density-dependent relationships with respect to slaughter weights (Bråthen 
et al. 2007), weights of live animals (Bårdsen et al. 2010), pregnancy rate, and fetal growth 
(Rødven 2010), and claimed losses to predators (Fauchald et al. 2004b). These relationships are 
linked to grazing effects on the pastures, because districts with high density of reindeer have 
reduced plant biomass at high elevations (Tveraa et al. 2007; Tveraa et al., unpublished 
manuscript), and marked reduction of palatable plant biomass in productive pasture areas 
(Bråthen et al. 2007).  
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APPENDIX 1. Subsidies and compensations to Saami pastoral families/herding units 
Operating subsidies: the main purpose is to increase net income by direct payment to herding units and local districts. Subsidies cover costs 
for planning, labour, herding and investments in breeding animals. From 1982 subsidies generally required licensed herding units.    




Restocking Livdyrtilskudd Payment for breeding 
animals to pastoralists 
with a too small herd.  
Before 1974, less than 200 reindeers. In 1974 regulations 
require application for loans and enlargement of herds to 
300 reindeers. After 1978 provided as interest-free 
credit. 
Total payments to the Kautokeino winter 













From 1968-1981 in the form of reduced tax. From 1982 it 
requires min. 70 reindeers and is provided as subsidies. 
The subsidies increase with larger herds. In 1988 requires 
public counts and harvest rates in local districts. 
Total payments published by Saami bailiff 
to 1978. From 1982 payments are from 




1981 the data were estimated based on a 





Driftstilskudd To cover operating 
costs, increase 
production capacity and 
net income of herding 
units. 
Graduated according to slaughter quota and reindeer 
numbers. Large herds had to slaughter a larger 
percentage to qualify for the grant. Losses more than 
10% could replace slaughter quota. From 1984 
requirements to counts signed by district foreman, and 
later public counts. After 2004 min. income from 
reindeer meat or products
iii
 and max. 600 reindeers. 
Payments published by the Saami bailiff to 
1978, thereafter from the paper archives 














Payment for shared 
operating costs in local 
districts. Includes 
temporarily 
replacement of labour 
because of illness, 
pregnancy or holidays. 
Requires working plan and budget. Before 1987 extra 
support for low degree of mechanization, except snow 
mobile and fences.  After 1987 requirements to slaughter 
quota, public counts and/or max. reindeer numbers.  
From paper archives at the Reindeer 








Ektefelletilskudd Subsidies to pay for 
work of spouse with 
limited wage income. 
Same requirements as for production subsidies (see 
below). Both spouses must be actively involved in 
reindeer husbandry and there are limits for extra income 
(at present, more than 150 000 NOK). 
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Production subsidies: the major intention of these subsidies is to increase production and delivery at slaughter houses, as well as to spare winter pastures. 
From 1989 these subsidies could be regarded as ex ante policies, due to their enhanced focus towards reduction of biophysical vulnerability.  
Subsidy Name (Norw.) Purpose Requirements and practice Data source Period for 
disbursement 
 
Delivery Drivetilskudd Payment for delivery at 
slaughter houses to 
improve quality of meat 
sold in the market. 
Quality marked by approved slaughterhouses with veterinary 
control. 
Calculated: Number of reindeer 
delivered at slaughter houses x payment 
per reindeer as published in regulations.  
1963-1990 
Skin subsidies Skinntilskudd Subsides for skins of high 
quality. To stimulate 
slaughter in autumn to 
spare winter pastures. 
Early delivery at slaughter houses, mainly before December. 
Most payment for delivery before mid-October. In 1984 the 
time limit was extended to 31. December.  
Self-reports from 1982-1984. Before 
1982 estimated based on prescriptions 




Kalvetilskudd To increase productivity 
and spare winter 
pastures by slaughtering 
calves instead of 1 ½ 
year-old reindeers.  
Delivery at slaughter houses before 31. January. From 1986 
graduated slaughter quota according to reindeer numbers. 
From 1989 same requirements as for production subsidies. 
After 1992 specification of min. calf weights and slaughter 
quota. 
From 1978-1986 estimated based on 
number of calf slaughtered
iv
 and 
prescriptions. From 1987 payments were 
managed by Reindeer Husbandry 
Administration, and data is from the 








Subsidies to stimulate 
increase production and 
harvest rates.  
From 1989 strict requirement to slaughter quota (min. 34% 
and 1000 kg) and public counts. Districts with reindeer 
numbers above their max. limit have to slaughter more. 
From 1994 graduated amount of kg or % according to herd 
size. From 1997, slaughter quota, max. 600 reindeers and 
weight limits. After 2000 winter, reduced requirements to 
slaughter quota and weights in Finnmark.   
Data from the reindeer husbandry 
administration. 1989 and 1990 paper 






Merslaktetilskudd Temporary subsidies to 
reduce reindeer 
numbers in Finnmark. 
Slaughter quota of min. 34%. Detailed prescriptions for 
reduction in districts with reindeer numbers above max. 
limits.  
Data from the reindeer husbandry 
administration. 1989 and 1990 paper 
archive, and electronic databases in 
1991. 
1989-1991 
Bonus Produksjonspremie To increase production 
by introducing payment 
by results. 
The payment is 25% of income from reindeer meat and 
products, including handicrafts. Until 2004 it requires an 
income between 30.000 - 400.000 NOK, thereafter 50.000 -
400.000 NOK, and max. 600 reindeers. 











To encourage slaughter 
in autumn to increase 
quality as well as to 
spare winter pastures. 
Delivery at slaughter houses before 31. December. Weight 
limits (14-16 kg). From 1997 same requirements as 
production subsidies.  From 2000 slaughter on summer 
pastures or 7 days after.   
Before 1997 estimated based on 
slaughter percentage in different 
months
v
 and prescriptions. From 1997 





Preventive measures: the main purpose is to cover expenses for preventive measures to reduce losses to predators or adverse winters (ex 
ante policies)  














reduce losses of 
reindeers due to 
catastrophes.  
From 1977. To obtain compensations a plan had to be 
made, including crises fodder, alternative migration 
routes and pastures or extra personnel for herding. The 
measures should not be to increase economic profits.  
 
Same as compensations 
for climatic disasters, but 
only minor payments 
until 1993. Extraordinary 













reduce losses of 
reindeers due to 
predators. 
Application that describes the project/preventive 
measure; aim, expected result, realization and 
timetable. Could include crises fodder, alternative 
migration routes and pastures, shepherd dogs, fences or 
extra personnel for herding 
From the County 
Governor in Finnmark 
from 1997 to 2004, and 
from the County 
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Compensation: the main purpose is to cover expenses of economic losses associated with predators or adverse winters (ex post policies). 









Application to the Saami bailiff and later to the environmental 
authorities. Evaluation normally based on documented losses 
in the area. 
From 1970 to 1981 
paper archives at the 















In 1977, documented abnormal losses (more than average or 
more than 10% of spring breeding herd), public counts 
(including sex and age) and a crisis plan. From 1983 
requirements to slaughter. From 1985 the regional co-
management board defines catastrophic events and accepts 
applications of losses. Requires slaughter quota and preventive 
measures previous years. In 1993 only extreme losses were 
compensated (more than 30%). After climatic disasters in 1997, 
losses above 10% were compensated. Requires preventive 
measures, max. 600 reindeer, and registered for subsidies. 
After 2002 requires production or operating subsidies one of 
the last three years. 




the disaster fund was 
not granted in 
Finnmark from 1977-
1980 because of strict 
requirements. From 
1981 paper archives, 
and from 1991 
electronic databases 













Payment for crisis winter in 1997 for certain areas/districts and 
min. 100 reindeers.  In 2000, max. 600 reindeers and registered 
for subsidies. Higher compensations if entitled to production 
subsidies previous years. 
Parliament documents 







                                                          
i
Annual report from the Saami Bailiff (Årsberetningene fra Lappefogden). From 1950 to 1968 there was one office for Finnmark county. From 1968 the Kautokeino winter 
pasture area established a separate office.  
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ii
The data were cross-checked with both the self-reports (Melding om reindrift) and the aggregate account (Totalregnskapet) published by the economic committee for 
reindeer husbandry. No major deviance was found. 
iii
See production bonus for minimum and maximum income. 
iv
We did not find the original data on number of calves slaughtered (Fraktkontoret for Slakt), but numbers were provided for the period 1978-1986 in the documents for 
the General Agreement for the Reindeer Industry in 1986 (Protokoll 1 utvalget). 
v
The numbers were found in the aggregate account (Totalregnskapet) 
vi
From 1977 to 1985, the fund was administrated by the Reindeer Husbandry Board (Reindriftsstyret), and from 1985 to 1993 as a separate fund. In 1993 it was transferred 
to The Reindeer Husbandry Development Fund. 
vii
Compensations (Katastrofe- og tapsfondet) were available from 1977, but no applications were granted until 1981. 
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APPENDIX 3. Interview inquiry of Saami reindeer pastoralists (Vera Hausner and Johnny-Leo
Jernsletten)
The study was designed for the purpose of understanding spatial and temporal differences in Saami
pastoral communities and reindeer herding practices that could be related to the ecological research on
reindeer abundance, productivity, and ecosystem change. Such an inquiry requires a variable-oriented
approach that balances comparability with an understanding of the cultural practices of indigenous
communities (Ragin 1987). We used mixed methods research (Bergman 2008, Creswell 2009, Teddlie
and Tashakkori 2009) and combined quantitative and qualitative approaches to collect and analyze data
on six thematic fields that are expected to underlie differences in the Saami pastoral community:
environmental risks, governance, herding practices, economic organization, symbolic, and social capital.
The dominant design feature was quantification to (i) obtain representativeness of districts and
subgroups of the Saami pastoral communities by multilevel stratified sampling and (ii) to ensure
comparability of numeric variables by including closed-ended items to explore predefined research
questions. There are, however, few previous studies on Saami pastoral communities, and reliance on our
predefined notions of mechanisms that explain spatial and temporal dissimilarities could be seriously
flawed. For each of the thematic areas, we therefore included open-ended questions and probes that
invited two-way conversations based on an understanding of reindeer herding practices (Bourdieu
1996).
Multilevel stratified sampling
Our aim was to gain an understanding of spatial and temporal differences in reindeer abundance and
productivity. Because this varies both spatially and relative to subgroups such as position, sex, and age,
we used multilevel stratified sampling. Participants were selected from an electronic database provided
by the Reindeer Husbandry Administration, which included data on reindeer herding units and
household members, as well as reindeer abundance and productivity. At the first level, neighboring
districts with high contrasts in abundances and productivity over the last 20 years were selected (20 of
34 on common winter grazing land in Finnmark). Because these districts vary according to number of
licensed herding units, we differentiated the number of Saami pastoralists interviewed according to size
of each district. We interviewed 3 reindeer owners in districts with less than 8 herding units, 4 in
districts with 8-14 units, and 5 in districts with more than 14 units. We used the official database on
herding units, including leaders and household members, to select participants. To limit our sample to
active reindeer herders, we excluded those herding units that had, on average, less than 20 reindeer from
2000 to 2006. From June 2007 to August 2008, we interviewed 77 reindeer herders, who represented
35% of the total number of herding units in the 20 districts.
At the next level, we sampled for heterogeneity to obtain a diversity of opinions about herding practices.
In all districts, we included three main categories: the district foreman and two herding unit leaders. The
two herding unit leaders were ranked and selected according to the highest and lowest average numbers
of reindeer from 2000 to 2006 to investigate differences in opinion between small and large reindeer
herd owners. If reindeer herders did not want to participate in the study, we moved to the next herder on
the ranked lists. In districts with more than eight units, we assigned reindeer herders to categories
according to kinship groups (siida), sex, and age. We targeted the categories that were not yet well
represented by the previous selections and randomly selected from these. Reindeer herders who spend
most of their time working with the herd are difficult to get in contact. We used 1.5 years to establish
contact with herders, which resulted in 84% participation from the first and second priorities on the lists.
The amount of time used to establish contact also limited the sample size of the interview inquiry.
Interviews
The interviews were conducted by two of the authors; Vera Hausner (Human Environmental Science)
and Johnny-Leo Jernsletten (Anthropology). First, we established contact with the participants by
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telephone. It was important that the participants could decide for themselves on the settings of the
interviews, which took place in private homes, herding cottages, cafés, offices, and outdoors. The
settings may have resulted in some qualitative differences between interviews, but the alternative would
have been reduced representativeness of the Saami pastoral community. We could not use a tape
recorder, since many Saami pastoralists are skeptical about assurances of anonymity, but both
researchers took notes and transcribed them together afterward. The interviews were structured
according to thematic frameworks, which allowed for conversational and two-way face-to-face
communication. We used a general interview guide approach (Teddlie and Tashakkori 2009), where the
wording and the order of questions was adjusted according to the course of each interview. We started
with informal conversations in which we probed interests, and closed-ended items were usually
introduced at a later stage. One of the interviewers could conduct the interview in the Saami language,
but this was only necessary in two cases.
Our standards for ethics were approved by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services and included a
letter of information about the study before the start of the interview to secure voluntary participation
and a perusal of the final transcript of the interview, if requested.
Analyses 
The data were analyzed using multiple techniques. The interviews were mapped for codes and themes
using NVivo 8 (11-15). All interviews were classified as an individual “case” (casebook) with personal
characteristics such as sex, age, and type of participant. In addition, all “cases” were classified with
geographical variables for the districts: East/West Finnmark, Island/Inland, and High/Low density. The
variables had to be standardized according to the closed-ended items by quantitizing the strength of
variables using fuzzy logic (Ragin 2000, Teddlie and Tashakkori 2009). Differences and similarities
between districts and subgroups was analyzed using qualitative comparative analyses (Grimm and
Rihoux 2006), multiple correspondence analysis (Greenacre and Blasius 2006), and homogeneity
analyses (Gifi 1990, de Leeuw and Mair 2007).
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